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Relationalism  maintains  that  perceptual  experience  involves,  as  part  of  its  nature,  a  distinctive  kind  of 
conscious perceptual relation between a subject of experience and an object of experience. Together with the 
claim that perceptual experience is presentational, relationalism is widely believed to be a core aspect of the 
naive realist outlook on perception. This is a mistake. I argue that naive realism about perception can be 
upheld without a commitment to relationalism.
 
1. Introduction
Naive realism is gaining in popularity. In recent discussions about perception, a number of authors 
have defended a naive realist conception of perceptual experience. The main selling point of naive 
realism is that it simply regiments a common-sense idea: perception is just the presentation of mind-
independent items to us. But what exactly does this amount to? And what does it not?
The  standard  view,  promoted  by  critics  and  proponents,  is  that  a  naive  realist  takes  a 
perceptual experience to be a kind of episode or event that is fundamentally both presentational and 
relational (Campbell 2002; Martin 2006; Nudds 2009; Nanay 2014; French 2018).  To claim that i
perceptual  experiences  are  fundamentally  presentational  is  to  claim  at  least  that  perceptual 
experiences are by their very nature constituted, at least in part, by mind-independent objects and 
their manifest properties.  In this way one is able to hold on to the natural idea that perceptual 
experiences are object-dependent: you can only have a perceptual experience of an object if that 
object exists. Further, to claim that perceptual experiences are fundamentally relational is to claim 
that perceptual experiences by their very nature involve a distinctive conscious relation between a 
conscious  subject  and  some  object  (Soteriou  2016,  p.  10).  This  relation  has  been  called  ‘the 
perceptual relation’,  or the relation of ‘acquaintance’ or ‘awareness’.  According to the standard 
view, a naive realist must take both object-dependence and mind-dependence to be a fundamental 
characteristic of the perceptual experience.
The standard view offers an unfortunate way of pinning down what naive realism amounts 
to.  It  portrays  the  naive  realist  as  being  committed  to  a  controversial  theory  about  perceptual 
experience—relationalism—where  there  is  no  such  commitment.  People  have  assumed  that 
conceiving  of  perceptual  experience  as  fundamentally  presentational  somehow commits  you to 
conceiving of perceptual experience as fundamentally relational. But this is false. My aim in this 
paper is to clear up this confusion and argue that a naive realist need not be a relationalist. 
My conclusion changes how we should understand naive realism and promises to reshape 
the wider debate about perceptual experience. If a perceptual episode by its very nature involves a 
relation of awareness, then any perceptual experience is fundamentally both an object-dependent 
and a mind-dependent occurrence. Yet it is far from obvious that a naive realist must affirm that 
perceptual experiences are mind-dependent in this fundamental way. My argument will show that a 
naive  realist  can  safeguard  a  deeply  realist  view of  perception  according  to  which  neither  the 
objects of perception nor the episodes in which those objects present themselves to us depend on 
the mind. This view is worth defending in its own right, yet we lose sight of this thoroughly realist 
outlook if we do not clearly distinguish between naive realism and the relational view of perception. 
 I will follow convention and assume that experiences are episodes or events. My argument does not require this asi -
sumption, and what I will say in this paper can be reformulated in terms of (mental) states or attitudes.
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Here  is  a  plan  of  the  paper.  I  argue  first  (§2)  that  the  relationalist  thesis  is  logically 
independent of the basic naive realist assumption that perception is fundamentally presentational. 
This  implies  that  the  claim  that  naive  realism  entails  relationalism  requires  additional 
presuppositions. In §3 I argue that the only plausible additional presupposition—that a perceptual 
relation  would  account  for  the  distinctive  phenomenal  character  of  perceptual  experience—is 
controversial. More to the point, there is an argument against relationalism about perception that 
can be entirely endorsed by the naive realist. The argument is the converse of the familiar argument 
from hallucination, which I discuss in §4. What is significant about hallucinations is that they are 
episodes  that  are  not  object-dependent,  yet  can  plausibly  be  taken  to  belong  to  the  same 
fundamental kind as perceptual experiences. In §5 I suggest that we can identify another kind of 
episode,  events  of  appearing,  which  conversely  are  not  mind-dependent  and  which  can  also 
plausibly  be  taken  to  belong  to  the  same  fundamental  kind  as  perceptual  experiences.  Taking 
seriously this basic connection between perceptual experiences and the broader class of events of 
appearing, in §6 I provide an argument—a structural converse of the argument from hallucination—
that shows that perceptual experiences belong to a fundamental kind of event that is not mind-
dependent. This ‘argument from appearing’ undermines relationalism, yet it leaves naive realism 
untouched. This suffices to show that naive realism about perception neither entails nor commits 
one to relationalism.
 
2. Naive realism and the relational assumption
It is uncontroversial that at the heart of naive realism lies a conception of perceptual experience as a 
kind  of  phenomenal  episode  that  is  fundamentally  presentational.  A  phenomenal  episode  is 
presentational if and only if the episode is constituted at least in part by some mind-independent 
objects and their qualities, such that those objects and qualities determine the phenomenal character 
of the episode. The term ‘presentational’ is here used technically, and the previous definition is 
more specific than simply the idea that the object of experience must be present, i.e. in a particular 
place; the episode also must be constituted by the object in a way that determines phenomenal 
character. As Matthew Soteriou puts it:
 
According  to  naïve  realism,  when  one  veridically  perceives  the  world,  the  mind-
independent items perceived, such as tables and trees and the properties they manifest to 
one when perceived, partly constitute one’s conscious experience, and hence determine its 
phenomenal character. (2016, p. 221)
The idea behind this conception of experience is that your current perceptual experience has its 
phenomenal character—the ground of what it is like to have the experience—at least in part because 
the objects you become aware of have that character (where the ‘because’ introduces a constitutive 
explanation, not a causal one). This makes it that the episode is object-dependent. 
For example, assuming that you are currently reading some words printed on a screen or a 
page, it is the mind-independent character of the printed words before you that constitutes part of 
the phenomenal character of the experience. In other words, at least some facts about what it is like 
for  you  to  undergo  the  episode  are  facts  about  ordinary,  mind-independent  objects  and  their 
manifest properties. It is in this way that a mind-independent environment can be said simply to 
show up to you in perceptual experience.
To claim that an event or episode x is fundamentally presentational is to claim that no event 
or  episode  y  of  the  same most  specific  kind  to  which  x  belongs  could  occur  without  y  being 
presentational (for this use of ‘fundamental’, see Soteriou 2016, p. 199; Logue 2013, p. 108; Martin 
2006;  Wiggins  1980,  2001).  The  naive  realist  assumes  that  to  characterize  our  perceptual 
experiences in a way that reflects their nature, or what is most fundamentally true of them, we have 
to  say  that  they  are  presentations  of  items  and  qualities  that  exist  mind-independently  in  the 
environment (see also Martin 2006, p. 354; Campbell 2002, p. 116). Proponents of naive realism 
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about perceptual experience argue that only this conception of perceptual experience captures the 
‘naive’ or  common-sense  idea,  implicit  in  our  everyday  talk  and  behaviour,  that  perception  is 
simply a way for the mind-independent world to show up to us. Charles Travis writes that a defence 
of this common sense idea already figured in the work of J.L. Austin, who thought that “rather than 
representing anything as so, our senses merely bring our surroundings into view; afford us some 
sort of awareness of them.” (Travis 2004, p. 64; see also Martin 2006). The naive realist follows 
Austin and conceives of the perceptual experience as simply the visual, tactile or otherwise sensible 
presentation of an environment that would have been there to perceive anyway.
The idea that perceptual experiences are fundamentally presentational lies at the heart of 
naive realism: one cannot be a naive realist and deny it. But conceiving of perceptual experience as 
a kind of phenomenal episode that is fundamentally presentational is also sufficient for a naive 
realist conception of perceptual experience (Martin 2006; Nudds 2009, p. 335; Berger and Nanay 
2016, p. 426). In other words, you count as a naive realist as soon as you hold that perceptual 
experiences are by their very nature constituted at least in part by the mind-independent objects and 
their  qualities,  such that  those objects  and qualities  determine the phenomenal  character  of  the 
episode.
Most sympathizers and critics of naive realism already accept these points. However, they 
typically also assume that this commitment about the fundamental nature of perceptual experience 
commits naive realists to a ‘relational assumption’. Soteriou characterizes this relational assumption 
as follows:
According  to  those  who  advocate  this  view,  when  you  have  a  conscious  perceptual 
experience  it  seems,  from the  inside,  as  though you are  perceptually  aware  of  various 
entities, and this is to be explained by the fact that when you have a conscious perceptual 
experience you are perceptually aware of various entities. A distinctive kind of conscious, 
perceptual relation obtains between you, as subject of the experience, and various entities 
that you are perceptually aware of in having that experience. (2016, p. 7)
The  relational  assumption  implies  that  perceptual  experiences  by  their  very  nature  involve  a 
distinctive, conscious relation between a subject of experience and the mind-independent world. In 
other words, someone who makes the assumption (‘a relationalist’) will maintain that no event or 
episode of the same fundamental kind as your current perceptual experience could occur in the 
absence  of  a  perceptual  relation  between  a  mind  and  some  object  or  quality.  The  relational 
assumption implies that perceptual experiences are fundamentally both mind-dependent and object-
dependent.
It is not at all obvious that a naive realist is indeed committed to relationalism in this sense. 
Still, many authors explicitly maintain that a naive realist is committed to the relational assumption. 
Heather  Logue,  for  example,  writes  that  naive  realism  holds  that  “at  least  some  perceptual 
experiences  fundamentally  consist  in  the  subject  bearing  the  perceptual  relation  to 
something” (2014, p. 225). Craig French writes that naive realists hold that “perceptual experiences 
have a  relational  nature  such that,  in  a  perceptual  experience,  a  perceiving subject  stands in  a 
perceptual relation to mind-independent objects” (French 2018). Some even go so far as to identify 
the  two positions.  For  example,  Tyler  Burge  takes  naive  realism to  be  “roughly  the  view that 
veridical perception is, without residue, a relation between a perceiver and an object” (2005, p. 2). 
And Bill Fish writes that “As theories of the conscious character of visual experience, I take naive 
realism and relationalism to be alternative names for the same thesis” (2009, p. 3n; see also Nanay 
2014 and Beck 2019).
It should be clear, however, that a relationalism about perception is not itself sufficient for a 
naive realist conception of perceptual experience. As Laura Gow has pointed out, some forms of 
representationalism about perception are relationalist as well (Gow 2018). Moreover, a sense-datum 
theorist  can  also  endorse  the  relational  assumption  without  thinking  that  one’s  perceptual 
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experience  is  by its  very  nature  constituted  (at  least  in  part)  by mind-independent  objects  and 
qualities.  Instead,  they  may  assume  it  is  constituted  by  mind-dependent  sense-data  (Robinson 
1994). For these reasons, relationalism does not entail naive realism. The more interesting question 
to consider, however, is whether it is necessary for a naive realist to be a relationalist.
First of all, if it is true that naive realism entails relationalism, then this does not seem to be 
a logical truth. The claim that perceptual experience is a kind of episode or event that is by its very 
nature presentational, and the claim that perceptual experience is a kind of episode or event that is 
by  its  very  nature  relational,  are  not  obviously  logically  equivalent.  By  analogy,  consider  the 
following claims:
 
A. By its very nature your outfit is at least in part constituted by some garments, such that those 
garments determine what it is like to wear the outfit
B. By its very nature your outfit involves a relation between you and some garments
 
Clearly,  claim A is  true.  Because it  is  a  collection of  clothes,  your  outfit  is  constituted by the 
garments that make it up. Moreover, the garments that constitute the outfit also determine, at least in 
part, its character and feel. However, as a collection of clothes, your outfit could equally have been 
worn by someone else or by nobody at all. We do not normally think of a collection of clothes, or its 
distinctive feel,  as essentially belonging to any person, let alone the person who happens to be 
wearing it. Therefore claim B is false. This illustrates that simply from the assumption that x is by 
its very nature constituted by y, such that y determines x’s character, it doesn’t follow that x by its 
very  nature  involves  a  relation  to  some z  distinct  from y.  This  suggests  that  the  claim that  a 
perceptual experience is a kind of episode or event that is by its very nature presentational does not 
logically entail the claim that a perceptual experience is a kind of episode or event that is by its very 
nature relational.
If the claim that a perceptual experience is a kind of episode or event that is by its very 
nature presentational does not logically entail the claim that a perceptual experience is a kind of 
episode or  event  that  is  by its  very nature relational,  then it  does not  follow that  a  perceptual 
experience, when conceived as a fundamentally presentational episode, must thereby be conceived 
as a kind of episode that fundamentally involves a perceptual relation. In that case, if relationalism 
somehow is a necessary commitment of any naive realist, then this could only be because of some 
further fact. In the next section I consider the most plausible candidate.
 
3. Explaining phenomenal character
Why would anyone think that naive realism must ultimately take the form of a relationalism about 
perceptual experience? One readily available answer has to do with the distinctive phenomenology 
of  perceptual  experience:  perhaps  only  a  relation  between a  subject  and  the  mind-independent 
objects or properties perceived can ground or explain (at least in part) the distinctive phenomenal 
character of perceptual experience in a way that respects naive realism.
Many  authors  who  have  written  about  the  nature  of  perception  agree  that  perceptual 
experience possesses a seeming ‘transparency’ or ‘openness’ to the world (Martin 2002; Crane and 
French 2017). This means that, from a subject’s point of view, perceptual experiences seem to be 
simple presentations of items and qualities in the environment and seem to allow one to learn about 
those very items or qualities. The Austinian characterisation of perception as simply bringing our 
surroundings into view is meant to capture this distinctive phenomenal character. As M.G.F. Martin 
puts it, “in its very conscious and so subjective character, the experience seems literally to include 
the world” (1997, p. 84).
But how could an experience have such a distinctive character? One might argue that a 
relation of acquaintance or awareness could help a naive realist answer this question. James Genone 
suggests  that  this  indeed  motivates  naive  realists  to  endorse  relationalism:  “In  claiming  that 
relations of awareness to objects and properties are part of the fundamental metaphysical nature of 
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perceptual experience,” he writes, “naïve realists hold that such relations are sufficient to account 
for the main explanatory challenges facing a theory of perception, in particular the phenomenology 
and epistemic role of experience” (2016). The thought here is that a naive realist is able to explain, 
at least in part, why your perceptual experience has this seeming transparency to the world, by 
referring to the fact that the experience relates you, as a conscious subject, to the mind-independent 
objects in your environment (see also Soteriou 2016, p. 40).
Concerns about answering an explanatory challenge may seem compelling. However, they 
offer no ground for attributing a relationalist assumption to the naive realist. The assumption that a 
relation of awareness explains the seeming transparency of perceptual experience goes well beyond 
anything a naive realist needs to claim. First, that one’s perceptual experience is by its very nature 
constituted at  least  in part  by the mind-independent  objects  and their  qualities,  such that  those 
objects and qualities determine the phenomenal character of the episode, at best entails that at least 
some  facts  about  the  character  of  your  perceptual  experience  are  facts  about  ordinary,  mind-
independent  objects  and  their  manifest  properties.  This  in  turn  suggests  that  some  of  the 
phenomenal character of the experience you have turns out to be identical to the character of some 
mind-independent things. Many naive realists indeed accept such an identity (e.g. Martin 1997; 
Kalderon 2007, p. 598). Nonetheless, it should be clear that accepting an identity between facts 
about objects and facts about experience does not itself commit you to any one specific explanation 
of that identity. Relationalism might be one way of explaining why perceptual experience has the 
phenomenal character it does, but it is certainly not the only way.
Moreover, suppose that the relational assumption offered the only possible explanation of 
the distinctive phenomenal character of perceptual experience as the naive realist conceives of it 
(which itself is unlikely).  Then still a naive realist would be free to deny that the phenomenal ii
character of perceptual experience demands an explanation to begin with. Primitivism about the 
character of perceptual experience is available, also to the naive realist (pace Tye 2015, p. 319). 
That perceptual experiences seem, from a subject’s point of view, to be simple presentations of 
items and qualities in an environment may just be a basic fact about the fundamental kind of event 
or episode that a perceptual experience is.
If the transparency of experience is a basic fact, it would be misguided even to think that 
there is an explanatory challenge. Acknowledging that perceptual experience indeed possesses this 
seeming ‘transparency’ or ‘openness’ to the world, a naive realist could urge that this is just what it 
is for items and sensible qualities in our environment to come into view (see e.g. Johnston 2009, 
Ch. 9 for a suggestion along these lines). Accepting the transparency of perceptual experience does 
not itself commit one to accepting the relational assumption. Hence, the claim that a naive realist 
must accept relationalism to explain the seeming transparency of perceptual experience is therefore 
baseless.
There could of  course be other  facts  that  make it  seem that  naive realism is  ultimately 
defensible  only  as  a  relationalism  about  perceptual  experience.  So  far  I  have  not  found  any 
plausible candidate. But I can demonstrate that naive realism and relationalism can come apart, by 
showing that naive realism can be maintained even if relationalism is false. I will do this in the 
remainder  of  this  paper.  My starting  point  is  the  familiar  argument  from hallucination.  I  will 
develop  an  argument  against  relationalism that  is  structurally  analogous  to  the  argument  from 
hallucination.  I  call  it  the argument  from appearing.  The argument  from appearing undermines 
relationalism,  but,  in  contrast  to  the  argument  from hallucination,  each  of  its  premises  can  be 
accepted by a naive realist. The validity of this argument suffices to demonstrate that naive realists 
need not be relationalists.
 It is unlikely that the relational assumption offers the only possible explanation of the distinctive phenomenal characii -
ter of perceptual experience as the naive realist conceives of it, because many versions of representationalism eschew 
relationalism and yet take themselves to be well placed to explain why your perceptual experience has the distinctive 
phenomenal character it has. See e.g. Harman 1990 and Siegel 2010.
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4. Lessons of hallucination
A relation obtains only if all of its relata—the things that stand in the relation—exist. Accordingly, 
the standard argument against the relational assumption purports to show that for at least some 
events  that  belong to  the fundamental  kind of  phenomenal  episode to  which also your  current 
perceptual experience belongs, one or more of the alleged perceptual relata need not exist. This 
would prove that perceptual experiences do not by their very nature relate conscious subjects to 
mind-independent objects in their environment.
Without exception, the traditional arguments against the relational assumption focus on the 
non-existence of the object of experience. The argument from hallucination does just this. Suppose 
that Paula, a normal perceiver, has a vivid hallucination of seeing a dagger at some distance from 
her. When we know that Paula hallucinates a dagger, we do not have to suppose that there now also 
exists  a  dagger  she  is  related  to.  Hallucinations  do  not  entail  the  existence  of  the  objects 
hallucinated;  they  are  not  object-dependent.  But  now consider  that  some  possible  episodes  of 
hallucination are indistinguishable, at least subjectively, from a normal perception of a dagger. This 
may suggest that hallucinations belong to the same fundamental kind of phenomenal episode as 
standard perceptual experiences. And if they do, then the possibility of such hallucinations proves 
that perceptual experiences are not by their very nature object-dependent, and so do not by their 
very nature involve a relation between a subject of experience and some object of experience. The 
relational assumption would be false.
Though  controversial,  the  argument  from  hallucination  is  widely  accepted.  Most 
philosophers who currently accept the argument from hallucination take it to show that perceptual 
experiences, just as hallucinations, are fundamentally representational episodes. By this they mean 
at least that one’s perceptual experience is a phenomenal episode or event that is not by its very 
nature constituted by the objects one perceives (e.g. Harman 1990; Siegel 2010; Nanay 2014).  iii
Such phenomenal episodes are, in the good or veridical case, appropriately linked to actual, mind-
independent objects in one’s environment (e.g. by being caused by those objects). Where such a 
link is present, the episode can veridically represent how one’s environment actually is. We then 
speak  of  a  perception  or  perceptual  experience.  On  the  other  hand,  in  cases  where  such  an 
appropriate link is absent, we have a non-veridical experience, such as an illusion, imagining or 
hallucination. Such non-veridical experiences do not veridically represent how one’s environment 
actually is, unless they do so by lucky accident (Lewis 1980).
Note, the need for a suitably linked object for a perceptual experience to occur does not 
force us to think of the perceptual experience as fundamentally a different kind of phenomenon than 
a hallucination (where there is no such need). Indeed, because they reject the idea that perception is 
fundamentally object-dependent, the representationalist can conceive of episodes of experience in a 
way that leaves it to extrinsic factors to determine whether we are dealing with a perception, or 
some kind of non-veridical experience, such as a hallucination.  This would imply that the proper iv
analysis  of  the  notion  of  perceptual  experience  is  conjunctive:  a  perceptual  experience  is 
fundamentally a representational episode, but one that happens to be appropriately linked to an 
actual object in the environment (Johnston 2004, p. 114). You may correctly introspect that you 
have a visual experience of a dagger, but this does not yet give you a conclusive reason to think that 
there exists a dagger you experience, because introspection might still be insufficient to determine 
whether the appropriate link to any actual dagger is also secured.
 An alternative take on the argument from hallucination is to suggest that the possibility of hallucination shows that iii
the objects of perceptual experience are available even to someone in a hallucinatory state; see Robinson 1994 and 
Johnston 2004 for different ways of elaborating this suggestion.
 See Hinton 1969 for a critical discussion of the notion of experience that is at work in the representationalist arguiv -
ment. See Byrne 2009 for a critical response.
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If the representationalist is right, then perceptual experiences do not fundamentally differ 
from hallucinations,  and  so  perceptual  experiences  do  not  fundamentally  involve  a  perceptual 
relation.  We should also note that the argument from hallucination, if sound, not only undermines v
the idea that perceptual experiences by their very nature involve a perceptual relation; the argument 
also undermines the idea that perceptual experiences by their very nature are constituted at least in 
part  by  the  mind-independent  objects  and  their  qualities,  such  that  those  objects  and  qualities 
determine the phenomenal character of the episode. This is because, just as a relation presupposes 
the existence of its relata, instances of constitution presuppose the existence of their constituents. 
And the items the naive realist takes to be constituents of the experience are precisely what the 
relationalist regards as belonging to the perception’s relata that are taken to be missing when we 
undergo  a  hallucination:  the  mind-independent  objects  and  their  qualities.  In  other  words,  the 
argument  from hallucination  threatens  both  the  relational  assumption,  and  the  assumption  that 
perceptual experiences are fundamentally presentational (Nudds 2009, p. 335).vi
The argument from hallucination is not conclusive. The main weakness of the argument is 
well  known: it  asks us to draw conclusions about ordinary perception from observations about 
hallucination, a kind of phenomenal episode that is not obviously of the same fundamental kind as a 
perceptual experience. Everyone agrees that there is some difference between hallucinations and 
veridical  perceptions,  and  so  it  may  well  be  that  they  turn  out  to  be  fundamentally  different 
phenomena (Martin 2006).  Moreover,  it  is  clear  that  hallucinations in some sense fall  short  or 
depart  from the norm—they are ‘non-veridical’ experiences,  if  they are experiences at  all.  The 
argument  from  hallucination  requires  us  to  assume  that,  despite  their  obvious  abnormality, 
hallucinations, as non-relational phenomena, exemplify the same fundamental kind of episode as 
standard  perceptual  experiences.  This  is  what  M.G.F.  Martin  has  called  a  Common  Kind 
Assumption, “that whatever kind of mental, or more narrowly experiential, event occurs when one 
perceives, the very same kind of event could occur were one hallucinating” (Martin 2006, p. 357). It 
suggests  that  the philosopher interested in the fundamental  nature of  perception can at  least  in 
principle come to know all they want to know by finding things out about hallucination, given that 
(according to the Common Kind Assumption) hallucinations manifest the same fundamental nature.
 
We  can  now  see  that  the  conclusion  of  the  argument  from  hallucination  rests  on  two 
premises (cf. Crane and French 2017):
 
1. Hallucinations by their very nature do not involve a relation between a subject of experience and 
an object of experience
2. For  any  perceptual  experience  you  have,  the  very  same  kind  of  event  could  occur  were  a 
hallucination to occur
3. Therefore, perceptual experiences by their very nature do not involve a relation between a subject 
of experience and an object of experience
 
It is perhaps unsurprising that typical responses to the argument from hallucination resist the 
second premise, the Common Kind Assumption, as it is the most controversial of the premises. 
Authors who have wished to defend relationalist or naive realist understandings of perception have 
almost invariably denied that hallucinations belong to the same fundamental kind as perceptual 
experiences, despite their superficial similarities (Martin 2006; Soteriou 2016; see Johnston 2004 
 Johnston 2004 offers the resources to defend the idea that also hallucinations are fundamentally relational, though he v
does not explicitly argue for this point. I will set this relational view of hallucinations aside, but see Raleigh 2014 for 
discussion. It is widely accepted that hallucinations are non-relational phenomena.
 As Gow (2018) brings out, the argument from hallucination also threatens relationalism as such. This includes vervi -
sions of relationalism that do not commit to a naive realism.
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for  an  exception).  Here  I  do  not  need  to  settle  the  dispute  about  whether  the  Common Kind 
Assumption  is  ultimately  defensible.  What  matters  for  my purposes  is  that  the  argument  from 
hallucination offers a template of how to argue successfully against the relational assumption: Try 
to show that one of the alleged relata in the alleged perceptual relation involved in a perceptual 
experience need not exist for an episode of the same fundamental kind to occur. As a corollary, one 
can show that a naive realist is not committed to relationalism by showing that this rejection of the 
relational assumption is acceptable in principle to a naive realist. For it would mean that at least 
some versions of naive realism are not committed to the relational assumption, because they can 
positively reject it. And if a naive realist can positively reject relationalism, then the two positions 
cannot but be strictly distinct.
But is there such a way? Can one undermine the relational assumption while leaving naive 
realism  untouched?  Clearly,  both  the  relationalist  and  the  naive  realist  are  committed  to  the 
existence of the mind-independent objects and qualities that are presented in an experience. Yet 
there  is  good  indication  to  think  that  a  relationalist  is  committed  to  more.  On  the  relational 
assumption, whenever we perceive a tomato, an episode of that same fundamental kind could not 
occur in the absence of either the object or the subject of experience (as well as the relation between 
the  two).  The perceptual  relation requires  both  object  and subject.  By contrast,  it  is  not  at  all 
obvious that the naive realist has this double commitment. For sure, a naive realist accepts that any 
perceptual  experience  is  object-dependent,  for  this  is  presupposed  by  the  assumption  that 
perceptions are fundamentally presentational. But must they equally assume that all perception is 
subject-dependent? Not if there are episodes which, while lacking a subject of experience, on a 
naive realist picture would still belong to the same fundamental kind as perceptual experiences. Are 
there such episodes? In what follows I will argue that there are.
 
5. Mind-independent appearings
How could episodes of the very same kind as perceptual experiences occur in the absence of a 
subject of experience? Aren’t perceptual experiences fundamentally mind-dependent episodes? A 
motivation for rejecting such an assumption can be found in Russell’s The Analysis of Mind (1921).
Russell denies that a subject or mind plays any substantive role in the analysis of mental 
phenomena,  including  perception.  Russell  follows  his  contemporaries  in  distinguishing 
conceptually between the object of experience, the mental content of experience, and the mental act 
of experience itself (1921, p. 16). He insists that in reality perception is not constituted by any 
contents or acts at all. Where most philosophers hold that perception must be analyzed as some 
possible compound of the three ingredients of act, content and object, Russell rails against such a 
view. He dismisses the appeal to perceptual act and perceptual contents—phenomena that require a 
mind for their reality—in standard theories of perception as ‘ghosts of the subject’ (p. 18). In the 
analysis of perception, he maintains, we can do away with both mental contents and mental acts and 
leave only the object and its qualities to account for what perception is.vii
What is the positive view defended here? To be sure, The Analysis of Mind contains a far 
more complex position on mental  life,  one that  ties together metaphysical,  epistemological  and 
scientific considerations. But the heart of its theory of perception is the simple idea that perceptions 
are appearances of objects. When you have a perception, a mind-independent reality appears to you. 
Your perceptual experience is no more than a kind of appearance of an object: an appearance that 
happens to occur in the presence of an organism with some degree of consciousness. As Russell 
puts it:
 Russell here takes inspiration from John Dewey, who suggests that a realist “try the experiment of conceiving pervii -
ceptions as pure natural events, not as cases of awareness or apprehension, and they will be surprised to see how little 
they miss” (1916, p. 262).
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we may define a “perception” of an object as the appearance of the object from a place 
where there is a brain (or, in lower animals, some suitable nervous structure), with sense-
organs and nerves forming part of the intervening medium. (1921, p. 181; see also p. 104ff)
As conscious  organisms with  suitable  sensory apparatuses,  Russell  assumes,  human beings  are 
receptive to appearances of objects in their environment.  A perceptual experience is simply the 
appearance of such an object where this appearance is registered by some organism.
Note that the ‘appearance’ of an object here is to be understood as referring to a kind of 
occurrence in which some object takes part, not as referring to the object itself or a quality of the 
object. An appearance requires some sensible object or quality to appear—it is the event or episode 
of the object’s appearing in some situation (cf. Cook-Wilson 1926, 796-797; Price 1964; Alston 
1999).  Think  of  how a  parakeet  can  be  said  to  have  appeared  on  my  lawn  on  a  Wednesday 
afternoon. The bird was a participant in that occurrence—the appearance couldn’t have taken place 
without it. By their very nature, appearances are possibly sensed.  The appearing of the parakeet viii
was an event that could have been registered by a suitably placed sensory apparatus. For this reason 
appearances are phenomenal episodes or events.
One implication of this concept of appearances as events of appearing is that they can take 
place regardless of whether there is anyone around actually to register the appearance when it takes 
place. At least on a realist assumption this is unobjectionable. A parakeet can appear in a garden 
regardless of whether there actually is anyone to appreciate its visual presence. When rays of light 
diffusely reflecting off its wings reach the other side of the lawn, the bird becomes visible from that 
side: as soon as the reflected light has spread, the bird appears, visually, at the far end of the garden. 
The bird is sensibly present in this way, regardless of whether there is someone around actually to 
become aware of its presence. It appears in (or to) some region of space, but not necessarily to 
anyone  or  anything  occupying  some point  in  that  region  (see  also  Johnston  2007,  p.  260).  In 
particular, the bird’s appearance does not require the presence of a subject. As Russell illustrates, a 
photographic plate placed on one end of the garden would equally be able to register the bird’s 
appearance by forming an image of the animal and its visual qualities (1921, p. 99). Photography 
gives evidence of the appearance’s mind-independent occurrence.
This straightforwardly realist conception of appearances, according to which objects and 
properties appear how they do regardless of whether they are perceptually experienced, is very 
much in line with a naive realism about perceptual experience.  Recall the Austinian idea that, ix
rather than being represented, when we have a perceptual experience our surroundings simply come 
into  view.  The  naive  realist,  by  accepting  that  perceptual  experiences  are  fundamentally 
presentational, already assumes that the items and qualities manifest to you when a bird appears to 
you do not depend on the existence of either a subject of experience or a perceiving organism, or 
anything apart from the bird and the way it presents itself (Campbell 2002; Martin 1997). A natural 
corollary of this is that the presentation of the bird is itself not fundamentally mind-dependent.
 That appearances are by their very nature possibly sensed does not mean that an account of appearances must take as viii
metaphysically prior what it is to sense or perceive the thing that appears. At least on a realist assumption, it is not ob-
jectionable as such to assume that the sensible character of the appearance is grounded in some primitive mind-inde-
pendent feature (Campbell 2002; Martin 1997). Hence, although it is true that if someone were suitably positioned they 
would sense or perceive the parakeet landing in the garden, this counterfactual need not be taken to reveal the nature of 
the appearance as such.
 To be clear, Russell still ends up endorsing a specific form of sense datum theory of perception. Yet, a naive realist ix
can easily accept Russell’s non-relational way of thinking about perceptual experience without endorsing the further 
assumptions that lead to a sense-datum theory. This is because naive realism and sense datum theory are structurally 
similar, and disagree only about the nature of the objects of experience or whether these objects are fully revealed
—‘given’—in the experience or not (Logue 2014, p. 225).
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Moreover, this conception of perceptual experiences still allows them to be fundamentally 
presentational.  The appearance of  the parakeet  on my lawn ontologically depends on that  very 
parakeet and its qualities (as well as on the lawn, its qualities, and any other participants in the 
event), simply because the bird is a constitutive participant in the event; it could not have been the 
appearance of that very parakeet if some other bird had turned up. Moreover, that very parakeet and 
its qualities determine the sensible character of the episode: that the appearance is the appearance of 
something greenish and not something blueish is because the parakeet is greenish, and not blueish. 
Accordingly, the episode of the parakeet’s appearing on the lawn is constituted at least in part by 
some mind-independent object and its qualities, such that this object and its qualities determine the 
phenomenal character  of the episode and accordingly determine what it  is  like for a conscious 
organism to undergo the episode. Similarly, the character of a photographic image registered by the 
plate on the far side of the garden would be determined in part by those objects and qualities that 
constitute the appearance the plate is designed to register.
To be clear, that objects and their qualities can appear quite independently of any perceiver 
does of course not imply that perceptual experiences can occur in the absence of a perceiver. For 
Russell,  this  is  ruled out  by the conjunctive analysis  of  perceptual  experience that  his  account 
suggests.  Perceptual  experiences  are  complex  events,  in  which  on  the  one  hand  some  mind-
independent item appears in a certain way, while on the other some organism with a brain, sensory 
organs and nerves registers this appearance. Only when both of these conditions—an appearance as 
well as its registration by an organism—are satisfied is the appearance of the item in question a 
perceptual experience. When no one is around to register the appearance, we can speak of a ‘mere 
appearance’; it is a presentation of an object in circumstances where a conscious subject is absent. 
However, none of this makes the event of appearing that is the perception—the phenomenal episode 
or event in which objects and qualities manifest themselves—in any way mind-dependent (a similar 
point is made by Johnston 2007).
What results is a boldly realist take on perceptual experience. Although the occurrence of 
those  appearances  that  amount  to  perceptual  experiences  presupposes  some  psychological 
occurrences—such  as  the  formation  of  mnemic  traces  in  some  organism  or  brain—such 
psychological occurrences never constitute the event in which something sensibly appears as such, 
not  even  in  part.  Perceptual  experiences  are  appearances  that  happen  to  possess  an  additional 
feature: they occur in the presence of a suitably placed sensitive organism. Hence, someone who 
adopts  this  analysis  of  perceptual  experience  can  accept  that  an  appearance  that  occurs  in  the 
absence  of  a  subject  of  experience  can  belong  to  the  same  fundamental  kind  as  your  current 
perceptual experience. This would mean that perceptual experiences are not by their very nature 
mind-dependent events.  This analysis of perceptual experience is not only compatible with, but 
naturally complements, the naive realist claim that a perceptual experience is by its very nature 
constituted at least in part by mind-independent items and their qualities, such that they determine 
the phenomenal character of the episode. Hence, it is possible to accept a boldly realist view of 
perception as an event of a fundamental kind that is not mind-dependent as part of a naive realism 
about perceptual experience. 
 
6. The argument from appearing
If one accepts that a perceptual experience by its nature is no more than an appearance of a mind-
independent object and its qualities (be it in the presence of a suitably placed organism), then one 
can  accept  that  an  episode  of  this  same fundamental  kind  can  occur  also  in  the  absence  of  a 
perceiver  or  subject  of  experience.  The previous discussion has  shown this  to  be correct.  This 
analysis prepares the ground for an argument against relationalism that is the exact converse of the 
argument from hallucination. Call this the ‘argument from appearing’.
The argument rests on two premises:
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1. Mere appearances by their very nature do not involve a relation between a subject of 
experience and an object of experience
2. For any perceptual experience you have, the very same kind of event could occur were a 
mere appearance to occur
3. Therefore, perceptual experiences by their very nature do not involve a relation between 
a subject of experience and an object of experience
 
Consider a tree in a park, on a Wednesday afternoon, with no one around to perceive it. That 
tree, illuminated by the midday sun and coloured and shaped as it is, appears in the park, both 
visually  and  tactually.  There  occurs  a  phenomenal  episode  in  which  the  tree  and  its  qualities 
manifest  themselves.  To assume that  the tree appears  in  the park in  this  way does not  require 
assuming that there now also exists some perceiver or subject of experience that the tree is related 
to.  Mere appearances do not entail the existence of any minds. But now consider that such an x
appearance is just what you would experience if you were there to perceive the tree. Surely, the 
mere fact  that  some appearance is  now registered by you does not make any difference to the 
appearance as such. Hence a tree’s appearing to nobody and a tree’s appearing to somebody are not 
events of a different fundamental kind. Standard perceptual experiences can belong to the same 
fundamental  kind of  phenomenal  episode as  mere appearances.  If  this  is  right,  then perceptual 
experiences are events that are not by their very nature mind-dependent. And if so, then given that 
any relation between a subject and an object of experience requires there to be a subject, perceptual 
experiences cannot by their very nature involve a relation between a subject of experience and some 
object of experience. If perceptual experiences indeed belong to the same fundamental kind as mere 
appearances, then the relational assumption is false.
Notice  that  the  argument  from  appearing  is  identical  in  form  to  the  argument  from 
hallucination. Recall:
 
1. Hallucinations  by  their  very  nature  do  not  involve  a  relation  between  a  subject  of 
experience and an object of experience
2. For any perceptual experience you have, the very same kind of event could occur were a 
hallucination to occur
3. Therefore, perceptual experiences by their very nature do not involve a relation between 
a subject of experience and an object of experience
 
Both  of  the  arguments  bring  out  that  although  it  may  be  true  that  we  cannot  have  a 
perception without the existence of the relata of the perceptual relation, this does not mean that 
perception is the kind of event that fundamentally requires the existence of these relata. This is 
because an episode of the same fundamental kind can occur even when some of the relata do not 
exist. The arguments’ conclusions are identical too: perceptual experiences do not by their nature 
involve a relation between a subject of experience and an object of experience. The arguments 
differ  only  in  which  non-perceptual  episode  they  take  as  their  focus.  The  argument  from 
hallucination uses the possibility of hallucinations to show that a relation is not fundamental to 
perception,  while  the  argument  from  appearing  uses  the  possibility  of  mere  appearances  to 
 Note, I am not here assuming that we can imagine a tree unperceived. All that my argument requires is that we can x
make sense of the possibility of an unperceived tree, which I take to be unproblematic even on a moderate perceptual 
realism.
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demonstrate the same conclusion.  This is where the arguments are each other’s converse, as they xi
focus on opposing ends of the alleged perceptual relation—in the one case the dispensability of an 
object of experience, in the other the dispensability of a subject of experience.
If sound, both the argument from hallucination and the argument from appearing undermine 
relationalism about perceptual experience. However, there is a crucial difference between the two 
arguments. In addition to undermining relationalism, the argument from hallucination also threatens 
naive realism about perception. Hence, naive realists can universally be found to resist the argument 
from hallucination. Superficially this may give the impression that, in resisting the argument from 
hallucination, naive realists would be seeking to salvage relationalism—hence easily inviting the 
association of the two positions (naive realism and relationalism) so common in current scholarship.
That no such association between naive realism and relationalism is warranted becomes 
clear  when  considering  the  results  of  the  argument  from  appearing.  Like  the  argument  from 
hallucination,  the  argument  from  appearing  would  undermine  relationalism  about  perceptual 
experience. Yet, in contrast with the argument from hallucination, it poses no threat whatsoever to 
naive realism. A naive realist can easily accept both of its premises—that mere appearances are not 
fundamentally  mind-dependent,  and that  the  fundamental  kind to  which perceptual  experiences 
belong can be shared with mere appearances—as well as its conclusion.
In a way, the naive realist position with respect to the relational assumption resembles that 
of the representationalist. Recall, a representationalist may accept the Common Kind Assumption, 
and urge that the term ‘veridical perception’ merely serves to register the fact that in certain cases 
we are dealing with a complex situation that involves, besides a kind of representational episode, an 
appropriate tie to an actual object in the environment. Similarly, a naive realist may make a similar 
assumption, and take the term ‘perceptual experience’ merely to register the fact that we are dealing 
with a complex situation that involves not just the sensible appearance of some object, but also a 
some conscious  being that  registers  that  appearance.  Making the  latter  assumption is  perfectly 
compatible with the idea that a perceptual experience is by its very nature constituted at least in part 
by  some mind-independent  object  and  its  qualities,  such  that  those  determine  the  phenomenal 
character of the episode. Accepting that perceptual experiences fundamentally are no more than 
sensible  appearances  of  mind-independent  objects  is  consistent  with  thinking  of  perceptual 
experiences as fundamentally presentational.
This implies that a naive realist can accept both premises and the conclusion of the argument 
from appearing. When you have a perceptual experience of a parakeet, the event of which you are 
or seem to be the subject does not by its very nature involve a relation between the bird and some 
subject of experience. Hence, a naive realist can accept that the relational assumption is false. 
This  conclusion  brings  out  a  key  contrast  between  naive  realism  and  relationalism. 
Relationalists about perception, by requiring there to be a subject of experience as one of the two 
relata of the perceptual relation, must conceive of perceptual experiences as by their very nature 
mind-dependent events. No such thing is true of a naive realist. What any naive realist must affirm 
is only that the perceptual experience, by its very nature, depends on some mind-independent object 
and its qualities. They need not accept that perceptual experiences at the same time by their very 
nature entail the existence of some mind. In this way, naive realism embodies a deeply realist view 
of both the objects of perception and of the phenomenal episodes in which those objects present 
themselves to us. This kind of realist treatment of perceptual experience gets obscured if we assume 
that naive realism is committed to a relational view of perception.
 
 A consequence of this difference in focus is that the Russellian argument avoids relying on taking obviously defective xi
cases to exemplify the fundamental nature of perceptual experience: though there is obviously something wrong with an 
experience of a tree in the absence of a tree, there is not obviously something wrong with the appearance of the tree in 
the absence of a perceiver. If anything, it seems the more common phenomenon, at least if we are not Berkelean ideal-
ists.
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7. Conclusion
A relationalist about perception maintains that perceptual experience by its very nature involves a 
distinctive kind of conscious perceptual relation between a subject  and some mind-independent 
reality. Naive realism is compatible with a relationalism. But even though naive realism could be 
combined with some form of relationalism, I  have shown that  this  is  by no means mandatory. 
Contrary to what is commonly assumed in current scholarship, naive realism is neither logically 
equivalent to nor entails any form of relationalism. One can be a naive realist  without being a 
relationalist.
To establish this, I have presented three arguments. First, I argued that from the assumption 
that  perceptual  experiences  are  by  their  very  nature  presentational  it  does  not  seem to  follow 
logically  that  they  must  involve  a  distinctive  conscious  perceptual  relation  to  a  subject  of 
experience. Second, I argued that a relationalism is not required to account for the phenomenal 
character  of  perceptual  experience.  Third,  I  have constructed an argument against  relationalism 
about perceptual experience that can be accepted by a naive realist.  This is  the argument from 
appearing. The argument from appearing concludes that perceptual experiences are events of a kind 
that  is  not  fundamentally  mind-dependent.  I  have  shown  how  this  argument  undermines 
relationalism, while the naive realist can accept both of its premises and its conclusion.
This  is  not  simply a  bookkeeping exercise  for  naive  realists.  Because  authors  have not 
clearly distinguished between naive realism and relationalism, arguments presented with a view on 
defending  the  relationalist  position  may  turn  out  only  to  support  naive  realism.  In  such  cases 
relationalism may prove itself unsupported. Moreover, if naive realism has fewer commitments than 
is  standardly  presumed,  then  some  objections  presented  against  the  view  may  instead  only 
undermine relationalism. The argument from appearing is a case in point. This may make naive 
realism more attractive as a philosophical view of perceptual experience compared to rival positions 
such as representationalism and sense-datum theory. Both these points deserve to be investigated in 
further work. 
None of this is intended to show that any individual naive realist cannot coherently make 
additional relationalist assumptions. A perceptual realism can come in many strengths and guises. 
What I hope to have done here is to undermine the widespread conviction that the naive realist must 
take perceptual experience to be fundamentally a relational, mind-dependent phenomenon.xii
 
 I am grateful for discussion of this material to Roberta Locatelli, Susanna Schellenberg and Li Li Tan. I am also xii
grateful to an anonymous referee for written comments.
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